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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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in Communist Propaganda

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
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 16 - 22 APRIL 1973

Moscow (2541 items)

Lenin Birth Anniversary	(--)	13%
China	(5%)	7%
May Day Slogans	(2%)	6%
Syrian National Day	(--)	5%
Vietnam	(6%)	4%
Mexican President	(4%)	3%
Echeverria in USSR		
Israeli Attack on Lebanon	(5%)	2%

Peking (1075 items)

Domestic Issues	(37%)	36%
Indochina	(25%)	25%
[Sihanouk's Travels	(18%)	9%]
[Lao Patriotic Front	(--)	3%]
Delegation in PRC		
[DRV/PRG Notes to	(--)	3%]
International Conference Participants		
Mexican President	(--)	11%
Echeverria in PRC		
PRC Friendship Delegation	(--)	7%
In Japan		
Israeli Attack on Lebanon	(3%)	5%
ECAFE Meeting in Tokyo	(1%)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

The U.S. moves calculated to induce communist compliance with the peace accord have thus far elicited from Hanoi about the least reaction that could have been expected. Thus the DRV has used routine, relatively low-level formats for its official protests against the major U.S. moves--the halt to mine-clearing operations, the resumption of reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam, and the suspension of the U.S.-DRV economic talks. And accompanying comment has not exceeded the level of NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles. Such articles have contained Hanoi's only reaction so far to the publicized statements by U.S. officials calling the American moves justified in light of communist violations of the peace accord. Hanoi has nowhere acknowledged the State Department notes to participants in the 12-power international conference on Vietnam--released 24 April--which detailed such violations.

The DRV may escalate its response on 27 April, when the 90-day period stipulated in the Paris accord for resolution of outstanding political issues runs out; the DRV and PRG have issued government statements marking the end of the two monthly anniversaries of the accord and may be holding some of their fire for similar statements at the conclusion of the third, critical month.

The DRV Foreign Ministry note of 16 April and the PRG memorandum of the 14th to the 12-power conference participants, detailing alleged U.S. and GVN violations of the accord, have yet to be answered by Peking or Moscow. Soviet media summarized the two communications with negligible supporting comment in routine-level foreign-language broadcasts, and Peking publicized the texts with no comment. Both may be holding off until the key 27 April date to draw maximum capital from publicity for their replies.

DRV PROTESTS U.S. PRESSURE MOVES BUT LIMITS SCOPE OF REACTION

The halt to U.S. mine-clearing operations in DRV waters on 17 April and the widespread U.S. reconnaissance flights over the DRV on the 19th were denounced in standard statements by the foreign ministry spokesman on the 19th and 20th, respectively, and the suspension of the U.S.-DRV economic talks in Paris on the 19th was formally protested on the same day in a press communique issued by the DRV delegation to the talks. The DRV spokesman's protests were endorsed

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by the PRG in a 21 April foreign ministry spokesman's statement which demanded that the United States quickly carry out the mine clearing, stop encroaching on DRV sovereignty and security, and "fully accomplish its duty of healing the wounds of war that it had caused the Vietnamese people."

MINE-CLEARING HALT The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement castigated the suspension of U.S. mine-clearing operations as a "blatant violation" of the Paris agreement and charged the United States with attempting to prolong the removal of the mines in order to "drag on the de facto blockade" of DRV waters. The level and content of the protest conformed to Hanoi's previous response to such a suspension: The 28 February U.S. halt in minesweeping operations had similarly prompted a spokesman's statement which, like the present one, demanded an immediate resumption of the clearing and warned in stock terms that the United States must "bear full responsibility." The 19 April protest, like the one in February, did not address itself to the reasons for the U.S. actions. Thus it did not acknowledge that the stated aim of the suspension was to force an end to communist violations of the accord, just as the 29 February statement ignored the stated U.S. position that the halt to clearing operations was responsive to Hanoi's delays in releasing American POW's.

RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS The spokesman's statement the next day on U.S. aerial reconnaissance was at the same level as two prior official protests on the same subject since the signing of the Paris accord, although the air intrusions cited this time were far more serious than those alleged in the previous protests--on 15 and 31 March.* The earlier statement referred to intrusions only over the two southernmost provinces of the DRV and the Vinh Linh Zone, just north of the DMZ; the current statement accused the United States of much more widespread reconnaissance over the DRV heartland, listing flights over Hanoi and Haiphong as well as over the provinces of Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Hoa Binh, Yen Bai, Vinh Phu, and Ha Bac.

Seeming to reflect the more serious nature of the current charges and the more critical situation throughout Indochina, however, the

* The earlier spokesman's protests, charging overflights on 12, 13, 29, and 31 March, are discussed in the TRENDS of 4 April 1973, page 5, and 21 March 1973, page 2.

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statement did escalate the decibel level of Hanoi's protests. It not only repeated the earlier statements' assertions that the United States had "grossly encroached" on DRV sovereignty and security and violated Article 2 of the Paris agreement, but it also decried the overflights as "a cynical provocation to the Vietnamese people and an insolent challenge to the world public which is sternly condemning the United States for escalating its war in Laos and Cambodia and increasing its military involvement in Indochina."

ECONOMIC CONSULTATIONS The press communique issued by the DRV delegation to the joint economic commission in Paris, released in Hanoi media on the 20th, denounced the U.S. suspension of the talks as "a deliberate act of sabotage" and urged that the United States end the suspension and enable the commission to continue its work.

Apparently reflecting unpublicized U.S.-DRV guidelines adopted at the time the economic commission was being established, the communique claimed for the first time that "by common agreement" it was to complete its work on 30 April 1973--"60 days after the commission was set up." The economic commission was first mentioned in the 14 February U.S.-DRV communique on Kissinger's visit to Hanoi; its establishment was announced in a communique on 8 March, although Hanoi's current reference to a 60-day period ending on 30 April implies that it was formed about a week earlier.

PRESS COMMENT A 21 April NHAN DAN article set the level and tone for Hanoi's initial comment following the official protests over the U.S. actions. There has been no reaction to date at the more authoritative level of an editorial. Like the 20 April statement on reconnaissance, the article placed the actions in a broader Indochina context, claiming that U.S. and GVN military moves throughout Indochina were linked in a "dark and premeditated plan" with the subsequent U.S. actions against the DRV specifically. Developing a theme that has recurred elsewhere in Hanoi comment, NHAN DAN charged the United States with attempting to cause "tension" in the DRV. It rejected as a "fantastic claim" and an "absurd slander" Secretary Rogers' suggestion that the U.S. actions were responsive to Hanoi's refusal to honor the cease-fire. A Liberation Radio broadcast on the 20th had been more specific in noting that Rogers had told a group of U.S. businessmen the Administration might cancel its economic plans for North Vietnam.

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A 22 April NHAN DAN article scored statements by U.S. Government officials that communist violations of the peace agreement had relieved the United States of responsibility to observe the accord in its entirety. Rejecting this notion as "absurd," NHAN DAN complained that U.S. violations of the Vietnam and Laos agreements had "increased visibly" since GVN President Thieu's visit to the United States and General Haig's tour of Southeast Asia.

In an evident response to these U.S. statements, a 23 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article charged that the United States had "brazenly" said it would carry out air reconnaissance as a warning measure and that it had thus "publicly acknowledged its violations of the Paris agreement." The army paper accused the United States of issuing its statements in order to "intimidate the Indochinese people" and to "prepare public opinion for intensified acts of war against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." The article appeared to be responding to U.S. pressure on the DRV to end its role in Cambodia when it went on to charge that the "immediate objective" of the anticipated "acts of war" was to "salvage the Lon Nol regime and continue implementation of the Nixon Doctrine so as to maintain neocolonialist regimes" in Indochina. Hanoi has taken no cognizance of U.S. press reports that State Department spokesman Bray on the 20th had indicated that the United States told the DRV the United States would respond positively if North Vietnam damped down the war in Cambodia and withdrew its troops.

Kissinger's remarks on Vietnam at a 23 April luncheon for newsmen were assailed routinely in a 25 April NHAN DAN article which scored him for "falsely accusing North Vietnam of systematically and brazenly violating all the main provisions of the peace agreement."

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PEKING OFFERS CAUTIOUS SUPPORT FOR CAMBODIAN ALLIES

Following a pattern that marked Peking's relations with its Vietnamese allies last year, the Chinese have been balancing their broader interests in Sino-U.S. detente with their commitment to Sihanouk's forces at a time when the latter are under U.S. military pressure. On 20 April Peking used the vehicle of a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article--the lowest level of authoritative Chinese comment--to second protests against U.S. bombing in Cambodia and Laos issued on the 17th by Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union and the NLHS Central Committee. In keeping with Peking's interest in removing big-power involvement in Indochina, Commentator demanded that the United States strictly observe the Paris and Vientiane agreements, but criticism of Washington was narrowly focused and there was no pledge of Chinese support and assistance to the communist forces. In another sign of Peking's desire to see an American withdrawal, NCNA on the 18th cited recent statements by several Congressmen from both parties voicing opposition to the U.S. air strikes.

Though divergent interests between Peking and its allies are again evident, there has been no strong indication of Chinese pressure on Sihanouk's front to seek an accommodation, as there had been in the Vietnam case. Peking's approach has been to stress the futility of U.S. support for the Lon Nol regime while rendering political support to its own client. Following up its triumphant reception of Sihanouk after his trip to "the liberated zone of Cambodia," Peking publicized the arrival on 20 April of So Photra, the Sihanouk son-in-law who attempted to bomb the presidential palace in Phnom Penh last month. NCNA reported his press conference on the 20th and "a cordial and friendly" meeting he had on the 22d with Yeh Chien-ying, the ranking Chinese military leader.

The Commentator article, markedly milder than the RGNU statement it seconded, accused the "U.S. Government" of having "repeatedly violated" the Paris and Vientiane agreements but directed its more sweeping charge at Saigon for having "never paid the slightest attention" to the Vietnam agreement. While echoing the charge of an ARVN incursion into Cambodia, Commentator did not implicate the United States. In contrast, the RGNU statement assigned major blame to the United States, portraying the alleged ARVN operation as the product of planning by President Nixon and the National Security Council following General Haig's recent tour and as a part of the President's "diabolical design" to reactivate the Indochina war.

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Peking's cautious approach was also reflected in NCNA's treatment of RGNU Defense Minister Khieu Samphan's 18 April statement protesting against U.S. actions and appealing for world support. The NCNA account ignored his reference to the question of Vietnamese communist troops in Cambodia, omitted his charge that the United States is continuing "deceitful activities on the diplomatic front" while stepping up air strikes, and dropped his criticism of President Nixon and the Phnom Penh leaders by name. Like the 17 April RGNU statement, Khieu Samphan denounced Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, and In Tam as traitors. The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article limited itself to references to Lon Nol and his unnamed "sworn confederates."

SIHANOUK TRIP HAILED ON INDOCHINA SUMMIT ANNIVERSARY

Peking and Hanoi used the occasion of the third anniversary of the Indochinese summit conference to hail Sihanouk's recent trip to Cambodia and to take critical note of U.S. actions in Indochina. Following past practice, Peking marked the anniversary with a message from Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai to the FUNK, Pathet Lao, DRV, and PRG leaders and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 25th. The message said "great changes" had taken place in Indochina with the signing of the Paris and Vientiane agreements and with the "resounding victories" being scored against "the traitorous Lon Nol clique." The editorial balanced these positive developments with more gloomy observations regarding the "unstable" Vietnam and Laos cease-fires and the U.S. bombings in Cambodia and support for Lon Nol. According to the editorial, Sihanouk's "successful inspection tour of the Cambodian liberated zone not long ago has vigorously inspired" the resistance movement. The Chinese referred only in general terms to a settlement, with no mention of Sihanouk's five-point declaration.

The Peking message promised that the Chinese will "resolutely support and assist" the Indochinese struggle, but the Chinese stopped well short of last year's strong avowals of support. Last year the Chinese called it their "bounden internationalist duty" to support and assist the Indochinese and said China provided a "reliable rear area" for the struggle.

As in the past, Hanoi sent a message to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth from President Ton Duc Thang and Premier Pham Van Dong. According to the message, the North Vietnamese "highly appreciate" Sihanouk's tour of Cambodia and "unswervingly and wholeheartedly support" the

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Cambodian struggle to realize Sihanouk's five-point program. After accusing the United States of continuing military involvement in Indochina, including air strikes in Cambodia, the message observed that the struggle "is still very hard and complex" but that the Indochinese peoples are redoubling their efforts and enhancing their solidarity.

NLHS RETURNS CHIEF NEGOTIATOR TO VIENTIANE, ISSUES STATEMENT

The departure for Vientiane of Phoumi Vongvichit, the NLHS secretary general, may signal a significant NLHS move to break the deadlock in the talks on implementation of the cease-fire agreement in Laos. Phoumi Vongvichit's arrival in Vientiane last February had been followed by an acceleration in the negotiations leading to the signing of the cease-fire accord on 21 February.* He left Vientiane on 24 February after signing the agreement and did not participate in the subsequent negotiations to formulate political and military protocols on how it is to be implemented. The announcement of his current return to Vientiane noted that he had been "appointed" special advisor to the NLHS delegation and plenipotentiary representative of NLHS Chairman Souphanouvong--the positions he held in the earlier talks.

The day before Phoumi left for Vientiane (and 60 days after the agreement was signed), the NLHS Central Committee issued its first statement on the status of the talks. It accused the United States--in conjunction with "the ultrareactionaries" in Laos--of instigating the Souvanna Phouma government to procrastinate at the talks in an effort "to play for time" so that intensified attacks could be launched against areas controlled by the NLHS. It censured "the ultrareactionaries" for exerting pressure on Souvanna to submit the agreement for discussion at the "so-called" National Assembly "in an attempt to carry out their scheme of sabotaging the judicial and political basis of the agreement." And it denounced the Vientiane government for making "preposterous political demands" in an effort to delay the formation of the new provisional government and the "National Political Union Council," a body the NLHS apparently hopes to use as a counterpoise to the provisional government expected to be dominated by Souvanna. In a speech on 14 April, Phoumi Vongvichit asserted that the government and the council would "administer the country"; the agreement,

* Phoumi Vongvichit's role in the negotiations is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 February 1973, page 12.

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however, stipulates only that the council will "discuss with" and "present its views" to the government on "major questions relating to domestic and foreign policies."

Hanoi's NHAN DAN published the NLHS Central Committee statement on 24 April, endorsing it in an accompanying article. Authoritative DRV support for the NLHS negotiating position had recently been expressed in a 16 April joint communique on the conclusion of an NLHS Delegation's visit to Hanoi. Moscow and Peking have been more reticent: Chinese media have carried no original comment on the talks, and Moscow has restricted itself to a few radio commentaries blandly maintaining that conditions for a settlement exist. Both Moscow and Peking reported the NLHS Central Committee statement, however--TASS summarizing it and NCNA carrying the text.

XUAN THUY MEETS SUSLOV, TOURS SEVERAL COMMUNIST CAPITALS

DRV Minister and Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Secretariat member Xuan Thuy arrived in Peking from Ulan Bator on 24 April, on his way home after a circuitous trip from Paris which included a trip to Moscow and visits to several other communist capitals. High-level East European delegations have visited Hanoi since the peace agreement was signed,* and Xuan Thuy's recent travels seem to be part of the DRV's ongoing effort to increase contacts with its communist allies. Not long after Xuan Thuy's 8-12 April Moscow visit, another high-level DRV figure turned up in the Soviet capital, with PRAVDA reporting on the 20th that Nguyen Van Tran, VWP Secretariat member and first secretary of the Hanoi party committee, had met on the preceding day with V.V. Grishin, CPSU Politburo member and Moscow city party first secretary.

XUAN THUY IN MOSCOW Aspects of Xuan Thuy's 8-12 April sojourn in Moscow suggest that he may have engaged in important talks there: He went out of his way to visit Moscow first, flying there from Paris and then backtracking to East Europe; the visit was the first he had made at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, and it included a meeting with Politburo member Suslov. Xuan Thuy had never previously been received by Suslov on his many stopovers in Moscow, although CPSU Central Committee Secretary Katushev, who was also present at the 11 April talks, has

* An East German delegation was in Hanoi from 15 to 19 March and a Czechoslovak delegation from 4 to 11 April. See the 11 April 1973 TRENDS, pages 10-11.

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seen him in the past.* PRAVDA reported on the 12th that at the meeting on the previous day, Xuan Thuy expressed "profound gratitude" for Soviet assistance and the Soviets stressed their intention to continue giving necessary aid to the DRV. In addition, the Soviet side said it supported the 31 March DRV statement and the 1 April PRG statement, and both sides called for strict implementation of the Paris agreement while condemning Saigon for continued violations.

EAST EUROPE TOUR From Moscow, Xuan Thuy went to Bucharest for a visit from 12 to 16 April at the invitation of the Romanian party Central Committee. He was received on the 14th by General Secretary Ceausescu, who assured him, according to Bucharest media, of Romania's "full support" and expressed a desire to further expand the relations and areas of cooperation between the two countries. Xuan Thuy arrived in Tirana on the 16th for a visit at the invitation of the Albanian government. In addition to his talks with Foreign Minister Nase, who hosted a dinner for him, he was received by First Secretary Enver Hoxha on the 18th. After a subsequent two-day stopover in Hungary, Xuan Thuy departed for Mongolia for a visit at the invitation of the party Central Committee.

Before attending the 12-power international Paris conference on Vietnam, Xuan Thuy had visited Poland from 6 to 9 February and Hungary from 17 to 21 February for talks presumably related to the two countries' roles as ICCS members. Their respective ICCS contingents departed for Vietnam immediately after Xuan Thuy's trip. He had talks with Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski and Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter and was received by Polish party leader Gierk. Although there were no reports that Kadar received Thuy, an account of a 19 February friendship rally indicated that he had conversed with the Hungarian party leader on that occasion. During both visits, the media duly reported various meetings and speeches in which the DRV expressed its gratitude for support and aid and the Poles and Hungarians pledged continued assistance and solidarity.

* Suslov did receive DRV Politburo member Le Duc Tho for the first time on his Moscow stopover on 14 October 1972 and again on 16 November. In addition, Truong Chinh was received by Suslov on 29 December while he was in Moscow leading a party-state delegation to the Soviet Union's 50th anniversary.

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DRV ELECTS DELEGATES TO LOWER-LEVEL PEOPLE'S COUNCILS

The biennial elections to people's councils below the provincial level were held in 15 of the DRV's provinces on 22 April, according to VNA accounts and Hanoi broadcasts on the 22d and 23d. According to VNA on the 21st, elections in 10 other provinces will be held on 29 April and in the Vinh Linh area on 20 May. No explanation was offered for the lengthy delay in calling Vinh Linh elections, but the area was hit hard by U.S. bombers before the cease-fire. A NHAN DAN editorial on 10 March had announced that the elections would be held between 1 and 30 April, and as recently as 11 April VNA had referred without qualification to "the forthcoming elections of the people's councils at all levels scheduled for 22 April 1973." The last people's council elections, which included elections to the provincial-level councils, were held from 25 to 30 April 1971.

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CHINA

SHANGHAI, PEKING HOLD SIMULTANEOUS TRADE UNION CONGRESSES

The 23 April NCNA announcements on trade union congresses held in Peking and Shanghai from 16 to 21 April register new momentum in the drive to rebuild mass organizations heralded in the New Year's Day joint editorial and underscore the Shanghai leadership's special role in the reconstruction of these auxiliary bodies of the party. The coordination of dates is highly unusual, and Shanghai's role is reflected in the leader turnouts at the two congresses: Shanghai leaders and Politburo members Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan appeared at the Peking congress to extend the leadership's "warm greetings," and third-ranking Shanghai leader Wang Hung-wen, back home from one of his stays among the upper reaches in Peking, was in charge of the Shanghai congress. Shanghai had been the bellwether in reorganizing the Communist Youth League (CYL), having been the first province-level unit to establish a new CYL committee. In a further reflection of Shanghai's leadership role in overseeing mass organizations, Chang and Wang appeared at the Peking municipal CYL congress early this month.

While Shanghai had announced a preparatory trade union meeting on 28 March, Peking had not previously indicated that its municipal congress was imminent. Shansi, in a 15 April provincial broadcast, is the only other province thus far to announce a preparatory trade union meeting. A 24 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the Peking and Shanghai congresses asserted that other congresses will be held "when the conditions are ripe."

The new Shanghai Trade Union Council is headed by Wang Hung-wen and includes female member of the Central Committee and Shanghai party secretary Wang Hsiu-chen (with Wang Hung-wen an early leader of the Shanghai workers movement during the cultural revolution), another female Central Committee member, a male alternate member, a standing committee member of the Shanghai party committee, and a vice chairman of the old Shanghai Trade Union Council. Peking's trade union is led by worker member of the Central Committee Ni Chih-iu and includes another full member of the Central Committee and an alternate member, a vice chairman of the old Peking Trade Union Council, and a female delegate to the last NPC.

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The 24 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial greeting the two congresses recalled the leading role of workers in carrying out the Shanghai "January revolution" in 1967 and their role in implementing Mao's call for the working class to assert leadership in the summer of 1968 (when youthful anarchy was getting out of hand). The editorial attacked "political swindlers" like Liu Shao-chi for trying to turn workers away from class struggle and for such "fallacies" as economism and of negating party leadership over the trade unions. The editorial indicated no important role for unions other than as a channel for transmitting party orders and increasing production, though it did state that the unions should "become schools for educating workers with communist ideas" and should pay attention to the well-being of the masses of workers and their families. None of the reports on trade unions has mentioned the right to strike granted by the draft party constitution which was circulated in late 1970 but never put into force, presumably as a result of leadership conflicts which began to surface at the second party plenum in early fall that year.

The editorial singled out the second plenum in concluding with a call for fulfilling the tasks set by the party's ninth Central Committee "and its second plenary session." The reconstitution of the party and its mass organizations, complemented by the rehabilitation of such leaders as Teng Hsiao-ping, is presumably responsive to this call and provides common ground for Chou En-lai and others like Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan having a vested interest in party pre-eminence.

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USTINOV LENIN ANNIVERSARY ADDRESS LOW-KEYED, OPTIMISTIC

In his first appearance as party spokesman on a major ceremonial occasion, Politburo candidate member Dmitry Ustinov gave a low-keyed, generally optimistic assessment of Soviet domestic and foreign policy in his address honoring the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth at a Kremlin reception on 20 April. Aside from Ponomarev's speech to the Berlin conference on the Communist Manifesto in mid-March, this was the first formal Politburo-level statement on national and world affairs since the beginning of the year.

On relations with the United States, Ustinov drew attention both to the positive impetus given by the Moscow summit and to the possibilities for favorable developments in the future. While striking a note of contingency by referring to the "forces working against this" in the United States and by reiterating Brezhnev's December 1972 formula that further progress would depend on continued adherence to the spirit of the summit, he stressed opportunities for constructive cooperation in the economic, scientific-technical, and cultural fields.

In contrast to his sanguine view of relations with the West, Ustinov sharply denounced Peking for pursuing policies he derided--in words ascribed to Lenin--as "strange and monstrous." There had been no direct reference to China in last year's Lenin Day address, which came a month after Brezhnev had staked out a wait-and-see position on relations with China and the United States in the period between the summits. Reflecting the unabated Sino-Soviet rivalry, Ustinov pledged that "our party and Leninist communists of all countries" will keep up the struggle against "the Maoist course." As Kosygin had done earlier this month in Sweden, Ustinov ridiculed Peking for spreading "myths about a Soviet military threat" to China.

On internal policy, Ustinov reviewed the achievements of the economy since the beginning of the ninth five-year plan and predicted that further progress would be obtained through improved management, increased efficiency, and greater application of science and technology rather than from additional investments of human and material resources.

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GORSHKOV CITES SURVIVABILITY OF SEA-BASED DETERRENT

Adopting for the first time a strategic view often ascribed by Soviet writers to the United States, Soviet Navy chief Sergey Gorshkov has asserted that nuclear-missile submarines are a more effective deterrent than land-based missiles due to their greater survivability. In the concluding installment of a lengthy series on naval strategy, published in the February 1973 issue of MORSKOY SBORNIK, Gorshkov set forth a rationale for large and versatile Soviet naval forces on the grounds of what he called the increasing "absolute and relative importance" of naval forces in a future war, the geographical position of the USSR, and the "political importance" of a large navy. He asserted that naval forces--particularly nuclear-missile-carrying submarines--are becoming one of the "most important factors" in a country's war-making and deterrent capabilities.

Gorshkov's article comes amid recent articles in RED STAR and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS that have described an increasing focus in U.S. policy on the development of naval strategic forces, ascribed in part to a U.S. belief in the survivability advantage of submarine-launched missile systems.

Gorshkov also complained about the continued growth of forward bases for U.S. naval and air forces in Europe and the Far East "despite the SALT talks." He mentioned in particular the new base for the 6th Fleet in Greece--"within carrier aircraft range of the central portions of the Soviet Union."

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CHINA - MEXICO

PRC READY TO ADHERE TO LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR PACT

Peking took the occasion of Mexican President Echeverria's global tour to score a point against Moscow in the third world by taking another step away from its formerly intransigent opposition to partial nuclear arms control measures. Taking an accommodating position on a matter dear to the Mexicans' heart, Peking declared in the 24 April Sino-Mexican communique that it was preparing to sign "as soon as possible" Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America--the instrument pledging nuclear powers to respect the nuclear-free status of Latin America. The Mexican side registered "deep satisfaction" over Peking's decision. Echeverria had arrived from Moscow empty-handed on this issue, which was ignored in the Soviet-Mexican communique.

As recently as last November Peking had reaffirmed that it was "in no position to sign" the protocol due to its mention of two partial treaties the PRC continues to oppose--the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In a note to Mexico's ambassador to China carried by NCNA on 15 November, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had at that time, however, declared Peking's willingness to adhere to the Tlatelolco Treaty's provisions on a unilateral basis.

Since its entry into the United Nations in the fall of 1971, Peking has declared its support in principle for nuclear-free zones and peace zones advocated by third world states, drawing a distinction between such measures and "sham" disarmament measures sponsored by the two superpowers such as the NPT and the U.S.-Soviet SALT agreements. China supported the Latin American zone and Sri Lanka's proposal for an Indian Ocean Peace Zone in UN debates last fall. NCNA, in a dispatch of 30 November 1972, also gave favorable coverage to a speech by Pakistan President Bhutto proposing a nuclear-free zone in the South Asian subcontinent. Chi Peng-fei's note on the Latin American zone was the first sign of Peking's movement away from the position that, while it supported the idea in principle, nuclear-free zones could not be established in practice until all nuclear countries agreed not to use nuclear weapons against zone countries and to dismantle all nuclear installations in those countries.

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Peking will most likely sign Additional Protocol II with reservations reflecting the objection to the NPT and the Test Ban Treaty which it reaffirmed in the joint communique. The United States has signed with its own reservations, and Echeverria--in an earlier stop in Paris--gained a French promise to sign, also with reservations. That leaves Moscow as a conspicuous holdout.*

* Moscow's objections to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as presently formulated are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 January 1973, pages 12-13.

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON MIDEAST: Reporting the 21 April UN Security Council resolution, Moscow focused on its condemnation of Israel's "recurrent military attacks" on Lebanon and ignored its general condemnation of "all acts of violence." TASS on the 19th indirectly acknowledged U.S. insistence on even-handed condemnation of all forms of violence in reporting the Cairo AL-AKHBAR's criticism of the U.S. stand in the Security Council debate. Regretting that the resolution failed to call for "effective measures" to end Israeli "acts of aggression," Moscow publicized Soviet delegate Malik's expression of readiness to support sanctions against Israel "up to exclusion" from the United Nations and claimed Arab "satisfaction" with this statement. While routinely complaining that the United States was responsible for "watering down" the resolution, Moscow was more critical of the Chinese for "avoiding the question of a political settlement" in the Middle East, for failing to propose concrete measures against Israel, and particularly for making "slandorous anti-Soviet tirades" against the USSR's position on non-use of force in international relations.

Moscow has taken note of Egypt's "important initiative," approved by the Security Council on the 20th, for a special Council meeting to study the overall Mide st situation but has given the proposal negligible publicity.

CHINA-USSR-HIMALAYAS: Peking and Moscow refrained from injecting their rivalry into the recent disturbances in Sikkim, but their reactions to developments in the Himalayas reflect a sense of the geopolitical implications for their interests. Where the Chinese express sympathy for attempts by local rulers--no matter how "feudal"--to reduce their dependence on India, the Soviets have viewed this affinity as evidence of Peking's effort to exert influence in the region. Reacting mildly to the Sikkim events through selected news reports carried by NCNA beginning 11 April, Peking interpreted the virtual Indian takeover as designed to squelch attempts led by the king to reduce India's "control and oppression." The Chinese made particular use of Nepalese as well as Pakistani comment, including a warning that India's takeover "rings an alarm bell for smaller states lying on India's periphery."

Moscow remained discreetly silent on the Sikkim developments, but recent Soviet comment on the region has included a strong anti-Chinese element. Thus, on 30 March the weekly NEW TIMES

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printed a letter from a Nepalese reader saying that "supporters of Maoism are openly entering into a pact with the local feudal lords and reactionaries against the democratic movement." The letter asked for more articles exposing Maoism. As part of Moscow's continuing campaign to portray Chinese troublemaking in bordering countries, a Soviet broadcast to South Asia on 8 April included Sikkim with India, Nepal, and Bhutan as countries where the Chinese have committed border provocations.

U.S.-EAST EUROPE RELATIONS: Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush's call for improved relations with East Europe in his 4 April speech at the United States Naval Academy evoked varying reactions from the communist states of Europe and Asia. Yugoslavia welcomed the speech and was the only communist state to acknowledge the secretary's reference to Albania. East Germany, Poland, and Bulgaria carried brief summaries but made no comment. The speech was 'elatedly reported in Prague media along with critical commentaries on U.S. policy. Although TASS summarized the speech, no report of the speech has been carried in Soviet media.

Czechoslovakia's critical reaction came on the 16th in an article in the Prague party daily RUDE PRAVO. Raising questions about the conditions attached to the offer, the article sought to construe the speech as an implicit appeal to the Warsaw Pact states to renounce their treaty obligations. It expressed "reservations" regarding the offer of most-favored-nation status in view of what it described as U.S. discrimination on this score in the present as well as in the past.

Peking reacted only in the form of an NCNA news report on the 8th, using selective quotation to suggest approval of what the Chinese regard as a move by the United States to loosen Moscow's hold on East Europe.

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